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EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENTNORMATIVE, DESCRIPTIVE, AND DOCTRINAL
INTERACTIONS: A REPLY TO PROFESSORS BEINER AND
BISOM-RAPP
Linda Hamilton Krieger*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,' two decades after passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 the United States Supreme Court recognized
a federal cause of action for hostile work environment sexual harassment.' In the years following Meritor, the lower federal courts struggled
to define the contours of the claim, including the circumstances under
which employers could be held vicariously liable for harassment by a
plaintiffs co-workers or supervisors. Although courts reached consensus relatively quickly on the standard of employer liability in cases
involving co-worker harassment,4 the precise circumstances under
which employers would be held responsible for harassment by
supervisors vexed and fractured federal courts for over a decade.'
Following their judicial counterparts in many states6 and the Equal
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall). A.B. Stanford University, 1975; J.D. New York University School of Law, 1978.
Portions of this essay are based on research conducted with Priya Sridharan and
Shawna Parks, J.D. Boalt Hall, 1999.
1. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
3. Hostile work environment harassment involves situations in which the plaintiff
has suffered no "tangible job detriment." A situation involving tangible job detriment
presents what is known as a "quid pro quo" harassment claim. For a discussion of the
distinction between these two types of claims, see Meritor,477 U.S. at 64-65.
4. Under this consensus standard, employers are held liable if they knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and effective remedial
action. This standard, which developed in the circuit courts, pre-dates Meritor. See, e.g.,
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983); accord, Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,
903 F.2d 1342, 1345 (10th Cir. 1990); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469
(3d Cir. 1990); Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 1989); Lipsett
v. Univ. of P. R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying the standard in a racial
harassment case); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th
Cir. 1988); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988); Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797
F.2d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining and applying the standard in a racial
harassment case).
5. For a discussion of these cases, see Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 785-86 (1998).
6. E.g., Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 526 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998); Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 691 (N.J. 1998).
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), some courts held that
employers were vicariously, that is to say automatically, liable for
otherwise actionable harassment of subordinates by supervisors and
managers.8 This approach was generally justified on the ground that,
under established principles of agency law, an employer is liable for an
employee's misconduct if the employee's ability to engage in the
misconduct was in some way assisted by his position with the employer.' Other courts took a different tack, and applied the same
standard used in co-worker harassment contexts, holding employers
liable for supervisor harassment only if the employer's managing agents
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt
and effective remedial action."
In the summer of 1998, the Supreme Court finally addressed the
issue. In a pair of cases, Faragherv. City of Boca Raton" and Burlington
Industries v. Ellerth," the Court determined, at least as an initial matter,
that in cases involving no tangible job detriment, employers could be
held vicariously liable for harassment by a supervisor with immediate
(or successively higher) authority over the plaintiff. The Court also held
that employers can avoid liability for supervisor sexual harassment by
establishing a two part affirmative defense. The employer must show
first that it "exercised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to
eliminate it when it might occur,"'" and second, that "the complaining
employee had failed to act with like reasonable care to take advantage

7.

At the time Faragher and Ellerth were decided, the EEOC's Guidelines on

Discrimination Because of Sex provided that employers should be held liable for
harassment by supervisors and managing agents "regardless of whether the specific acts
complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of
whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence." 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11 (c) (1998).
8. E.g., Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir.
1993) (noting that a harassing supervisor is always assisted in his misconduct by the
supervisory relationship).
9. This principle is described in and adopted by THE RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY

§ 219(2)(d) (1957).
10. See, e.g., Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1345 (10th Cir. 1990)
(stating that employers are liable for supervisor harassment of which management-level
employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known); EEOC v.
Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (same).
11. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
12. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
13. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805. Writing for a seven-justice majority in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined, Justice Kennedy adopted the same affirmative defense in
Burlington Industries, Inc., 524 U.S. at 765.
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of the employer's safeguards and otherwise to prevent harm that could
have been avoided."' 4
Writing for the majority in Faragher,Justice Souter conceded that
the Court's decision was hard to reconcile with a long line of cases
applying the same agency principles in other contexts, 5 and was also
difficult to square with a realistic understanding of the power imbalance
inherent in any supervisor-supervisee relationship. 6 Justice Souter

nonetheless justified the Court's pronouncement of the new defense on
the ground that it would serve Title VII's "primary objective," which,
he opined, is "not to provide redress but to avoid harm."' 7
To best advance this broad objective, the Faragher majority
reasoned, liability standards should be structured so as to provide
employers with incentives to prevent legal violations, and employees
with corresponding incentives "'to use such means as are reasonable
under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages' that result
from violations of the statute.'
An employer's ability to succeed in
establishing this affirmative defense, the Court suggested, should turn
at least in part on two salient factors: (1) whether the employer had
promulgated an anti-harassment policy and a corresponding complaint
procedure; and (2) whether the plaintiff had utilized the complaint
procedure the employer provided.'
14. Faragher,524 U.S. at 805.
15. For example, noting that its own "scope of employment" analysis, like that
employed by lower courts rejecting automatic employer liability for supervisor
harassment, was difficult to reconcile with the larger body of agency jurisprudence,
Justice Souter conceded: "These cases ostensibly stand in some tension with others
arising outside Title VII, where the scope of employment has been defined broadly
enough to hold employers vicariously liable for intentional torts that were in no sense
inspired by any purpose to serve the employer." Id
16. Specifically, with respect to the "apparent authority" basis for vicarious
liability, Justice Souter conceded: "[I]n implementing Title VII it makes sense to hold
an employer vicariously liable for some tortious conduct of a supervisor made possible
by abuse of his supervisory authority," and that "there is a sense in which a harassing
supervisor is always assisted in his misconduct by the supervisory relationship." Id.
17. Id. at 805-06 (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18
(1975)).
18. Id. at 806 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982),
quoting in turn, CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 127
(1935)). It is important to note that, at least in the anti-discrimination context, a "duty
to minimize harm" had never before been applied to limit liability. Both Ford Motor Co.
and the McCormick treatise that it quoted, concerned only the amount of monetary
damages that might be recovered once liability attached. The duty to exercise
reasonable care to avoid harm imposed on plaintiffs by Faragherthus functions more
like the contributory negligence rule, which once operated to limit liability in personal
injury cases but fell out of favor for a variety of policy reasons in the 1950s.
19. Specifically, the Court provided on this point:
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Thus, for the first time in Title VII's history, the Supreme Court
imposed on a group of discrimination plaintiffs an affirmative duty,
albeit a potentially qualified one,2" to utilize an employer's internal
grievance procedure before filing an administrative or judicial discrimination complaint. Viewed more broadly, the Court's decision in
Faragher2 ' for the first time imposed on a subclass of Title VII plaintiffs
a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid being damaged by sexism in
the workplace.
Moreover, the Faragher Court elevated what legal sociologist
Lauren Edelman has termed "symbolic compliance structures" to the
level of an affirmative defense to an otherwise meritorious sexual
harassment claim.2 These compliance structures include anti-harassment policies, training programs, and grievance procedures, which
before Faragherhad little, if any, direct effect on liability.' Thus, after
Faragher, an employer can limit its potential harassment liability not
only probabilistically, by taking steps to reduce the likelihood that
harassment will occur and result in the filing of a lawsuit, but also
directly, by instituting and then using symbolic compliance structures
to establish a legally efficacious defense to an otherwise actionable
claim.24 As Professors Beiner' and Bisom-Rapp26 suggest, these are
[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation

of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a
demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's
burden under the second element of the defense.
Id. at 807-08.
20. The Court speaks not of any failure, but only of an unreasonable failure to
utilize a complaint procedure as satisfying the second element of the employer's
affirmative defense. Faragher,524 U.S. at 807-08.
21. Much of my analysis pertains to the Court's decisions in both Ellerth and
Faragher,which overlap analytically in numerous important respects. However, for ease
of expression, I refer here primarily to Faragher.
22. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational
Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1542-47 (1992) (describing process

by which organizations respond to the legal environment by developing symbolic
indicia of compliance with ambiguous legal mandates).
23. Id. at 1547. It should be noted, however, that Edelman and her colleagues
found moderate rates of judicial deference to employer grievance procedures even
before Faragher and Ellerth. Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen, & Howard S.
Erlanger, The Endogeneityof Legal Regulation: GrievanceProceduresas RationalMyth, 105

AM. J. Soc. 406,439 (1999).
24. As Professor Bisom-Rapp observes, and as is described in greater detail below,
Faragher in this regard provides remarkable empirical validation of Lauren Edelman's
theory of socio-legal endogeneity. Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor
Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confrontingthe Developing Jurisprudenceof Education and
Prevention in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001)
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dramatic developments, and they carry broad implications for sociolegal scholarship on employer compliance with and employee mobilization of equal employment opportunity laws.
If we examine Faragher closely, we see that the Court's analysis
reflects three different accounts of victim response to sexualized
workplace conduct. First, and most obviously, we find in the Court's
opinion a doctrinal account: to be entitled to a Title VII remedy for
sexual harassment, a woman must respond (assuming the employer's
showing under the first prong has been made) by utilizing an available
grievance procedure early in a sequence of harassing events. The key
phrase here is "must respond." If a person wishes to obtain a particular
legal outcome, she must act in a particular way.
Second, we find embedded in Faragher a normative account: a
woman exposed to unwelcome sexualized conduct in the workplace
should respond by filing an internal harassment complaint early in a
sequence of harassing events. The key word here, of course, is
"should." It unambiguously signals the presence of a normative claim.
Finally, the Court's analysis in Faragheris premised on a particular
descriptive account of women's responses to sexualized workplace
conduct. The account goes something like this: absent some unreasonableness on her part, some sort of personality quirk or flaw, a woman
who is truly exposed to unwelcome sexualized workplace conduct can
be expected to complain about it to her employer, especially if a formal
complaint procedure is available (this, of course, being a central
question addressed in connection with the first prong). The critical
phrase is "can be expected to respond." We are dealing here with a
positive account of victim response, an empirical claim about what
people in certain situations will do.
Significantly, in the Faragher Court's analysis, the Court's
doctrinal, normative, and descriptive accounts closely cohere. Women
legally must respond, should respond, and can be expected to respond
to unwanted sexualized workplace conduct in precisely the same way,
by reporting the unwelcome conduct to their employers early in an
escalating sequence of harassing events.
(exploring application of Edelman's theory of socio-legal endogeneity to Faragher and
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)); Edelman et al., supra note 23,

at 445-49 (elaborating theory of socio-legal endogeneity).
25. See generally Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's Stories in Sexual
HarassmentCases, 24 U. ARK. LrTLE RoCK L. REV. 117 (200 1).
26. See generally Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The
QuestionableEmbrace ofEmployee Sexual HarassmentTrainingby the Legal Profession,24
U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 147 (2001).

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

Faragher'sfirst prong can be parsed out in similar fashion. We can
extract from the Court's analysis a doctrinal account, a normative
account, and a descriptive account of employer response to the problem
of unwelcome sexualized workplace conduct.
First, the doctrinal account: to avoid liability for hostile work
environment harassment by supervisors, an employer must respond to
the problem of unwanted sexualized workplace conduct by taking
reasonable care to prevent such conduct from occurring and by dealing
with it swiftly if and when it does occur. As before, the key phrase is
"must respond." The decision tells us how a relevant legal actor must
act to obtain a desired legal outcome.
Second, we find embedded in the first prong a normative account
of employer conduct: an employer should respond to the problem of
unwelcome sexualized workplace conduct by taking reasonable care to
prevent harassment from occurring. Here again, the word "should"
indicates that we are dealing with a normative claim.
Third, as Professor Bisom-Rapp demonstrates, the first prong
incorporates an implicit descriptive account as well. By promulgating
policies against harassment, establishing harassment complaint
procedures, and conducting anti-harassment trainings, employers will
prevent harassment from occurring, or will at least greatly reduce its
incidence. Thus, in the world according to Faragher, anti-harassment
policies and complaint procedures work. For this reason, they equate to
reasonable care. As should be clear, the success of the entire prophylactic project undertaken in Faragher depends on the accuracy of this
simple positive claim: anti-harassment policies, grievance procedures,
and training programs prevent sexual harassment from occurring.
As was true with respect to victim response, the doctrinal,
normative, and descriptive accounts reflected in the first prong neatly
cohere. Title VII-compliant employers must have anti-harassment
policies, grievance procedures, and training, should have anti-harassment
policies, grievance procedures, and training, and will have anti-harassment policies, grievance procedures, and training. Moreover, those
policies, procedures, and training will reduce the incidence of harassment and discrimination. They will operate to prevent harm.
Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp show us, however, that with
respect to both the first and second prongs, the Court's descriptive
accounts have serious problems. Consider the descriptive account
underpinning the first prong. The Court simply assumes, unconstrained
by empirical inquiry, that if an organization institutes anti-harassment
policies and training programs, it will prevent harassment from
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occurring, or at least significantly reduce its occurrence. For this reason,
the Court finds it logical to conclude that Title VII should be interpreted
in a manner that encourages employers to establish such policies and
programs.27 And yet, as Professor Bisom-Rapp describes, there exists
no empirical evidence supporting this assumption, on which both an
emerging civil rights jurisprudence28 and a multi-billion dollar personnel
training industry now rest.
With respect to the second prong, the problem is more serious still.
As Professor Beiner describes,29 the basic assumption underlying the
second prong-namely, that "rational" harassment victims necessarily
utilize available internal grievance procedures-is not only empirically
unsupported, it has actually been empirically disconfirmed.
My own work with Shawna Parks and Priya Sridharan 3 came to
much the same conclusion. There now exists a robust social science
literature investigating how women respond to and cope with sexualized workplace conduct. This literature indicates that women rarely
report such conduct, that they often have sound reasons for not doing
so, and that they deploy a variety of alternative strategies in an effort to
avoid the harm such behavior inflicts. Because these findings have such
significant implications for the prophylactic efficacy of the FaragherEllerth affirmative defense, I take the time to elaborate upon them here.
II. WOMEN'S RESPONSES TO SEXUALIZED WORKPLACE CONDUCT:
THE VIEW FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE

Empirical research conducted in a wide variety of settings and
studying women from many different racial, ethnic, and socio-economic
groups demonstrates that, in fact, few women ever report sexual
27. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (describing how
the affirmative defense, by providing employers with incentives to create such policies
and programs, will serve Title VII's primary objective of "avoiding harm").
28. Professor Bisom-Rapp refers to this emerging hermeneutic as the
"jurisprudence of education and prevention." See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 26, at 156.
29. Beiner, supra note 25, at 130; see also Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social
Knowledge: The Implications ofSocial Science Research on Imputing Liabilityto Employers
for Sexual Harassment,7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273 (2001) [hereinafter Beiner,
Sex, Science, and Social Knowledge].
30. Linda Krieger, Shawna Parks, & Priya Sridharan, Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment: Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions (May 2000)
(unpublished paper presented at the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting,
Miami, on file with author); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The FirstBite Is Free: Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. Prrr. L. REv. 671, 722-28 (2000) (reviewing
literature).
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harassment to employers through official channels, especially at the
early stages of an escalating harassment situation. Instead, women
devise strategies for coping with sexual harassment by drawing on a far
wider range of possible responses than that assumed by the Faragher
Court. Moreover, women often revise these coping strategies over time,
adapting to changes in the sexual harassment situation as it progresses.
At the outset, it bears mention that studies of harassment response
patterns necessarily confront the difficult tasks of defining sexual
harassment and of phrasing survey questions in a way that will not
systematically bias subjects' responses. Specifically, to determine how
women respond to sexual harassment, researchers must describe
particular behaviors, and then ask subjects how they responded in the
past to, or anticipate that they would respond in the future to, such
behaviors. Describing the behavior in question as "sexual harassment"
could conceivably skew subject responses towards particular patterns
of response, particularly anticipated response. As a general rule, women
refer to only the most extreme forms of sexualized workplace conduct
as "sexual harassment."'" Patterns of response to sexualized workplace
conduct positively covary with the perceived severity of the conduct in
question. Indeed, survey questions referring to incidents of sexualized
workplace conduct as "sexual harassment" appear to skew patterns of
response in a more assertive direction. For this reason, researchers
generally avoid describing sexualized workplace conduct as "sexual
harassment,"32 referring to it instead as "sexual conduct."
This is no idle observation. To the contrary, it has important
implications for the judicial elaboration and application of Faragher's
second prong. By the time a court is applying the Faragher affirmative
defense, it has already determined that the conduct complained of was
"sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.' 3
Having characterized the conduct in question as "sexual harassment,"
31. See, e.g., Linda Brooks & Annette R. Perot, Reporting Sexual Harassment:
Exploring a Predictive Model, 15 PsYCHOL. WoMEN Q. 31, 33 (1991) (reporting that the
vast majority of women subjects were unwilling to apply the term "sexual harassment"

to the all but the most extreme forms of sexualized workplace behavior).
32. See, e.g., James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women's Responses to Sexual
Harassment: A Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 543, 549 (1995)
("The words sexual harassment were not used so that the interviewees' replies would not

be influenced by their perception of these types of attention as harassment.").
33. For sexualized workplace conduct to be actionable as sexual harassment under
Title VII, it must satisfy this standard, adopted by the Supreme Court in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
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a court is apt to view highly assertive strategies, such as the utilization
of an employer's complaint procedure, as the most "reasonable"
response strategy.
However, a woman responding to particular conduct at the time it
occurs will necessarily view the situation from a different temporal and
evaluative standpoint. Particularly where discrete episodes of harassment occur over time, only eventually compounding to constitute
actionable harassment, incidents occurring earlier in the sequence may
not be viewed by the victim as "sexual harassment" at all-and
reasonably so. As one commentator has noted:
In order to properly assess a woman's reasonableness vis-;k-vis the
second prong of the affrmative defense, a trier must judge her
inaction, if it need be judged at all, from the vantage point of one
who is (1) currently employed at the corporation and (2) has no way
of ascertaining that she will be believed and validated in a public
forum. Indeed, it appears as though courts that judge victims as
unreasonable in such a mechanized way are looking at the victims
through the eyes of one prescient enough to know that the prima
facie case has been taken to court and successfully made out before
a tribunal. 4
As this commentator's observation reflects, post-Faragher, both the
characterization of conduct as "sexual harassment" and the impact of
that characterization on an observer's expectations of how the target of
the conduct should respond have become highly significant. Courts are
now being asked to accept, and indeed are often accepting, employer
arguments to the effect that a plaintiff's otherwise meritorious sexual
harassment case should be dismissed because the plaintiff, although she
eventually did file a formal harassment complaint with her employer,
5
did not do so soon enough.
A.

Patterns of Response to Sexualized Workplace Conduct:
Alternative Classification Schemes

Any empirical investigation of women's responses to sexualized
workplace conduct requires a classification scheme capable of defining
and ordering alternative responsive strategies in a theoretically useful
34. Kerri Lynn Bauchner, From Pig in a Parlorto Boar in a Boardroom: Why Ellerth
Isn't Working andiHow OtherIdeologicalModels Can Help Reconceptualize the Law of Sexual
Harassment,8 COLUM. J. GENDER& L. 303, 317 (1999).
35. Beiner, Sex, Science, and Social Knowledge, supra note 29 at 273-74 (discussing

lower court interpretation of Faragher'ssecond prong).
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way. Over the past two decades, sexual harassment researchers have
developed a number of such schemes, broadly dividing into two
overarching categories. Each of these categories reflects a particular
theoretical perspective and illuminates a different aspect of the problem
being studied.
1.

Schemes DesignedAround Externally FocusedResponse
Modalities: The Assertiveness Continuum

The earliest and, in many ways, most influential harassment
response classification system was developed by David Terpstra and
Douglas Baker in 1989.36 The Terpstra and Baker scheme differentiates
response modalities along a continuum, with relatively passive
responses at one end and relatively assertive modalities on the other.
The scheme posits the following response categories:
(1) Ignore/Do Nothing
(2) Avoidance (avoid person or area in which they might be located)
(3) Positive Verbal Confrontation (talk or discuss; explain why
behavior is bothersome, etc.)
(4) Negative Verbal Confrontation (verbally attack; embarrass,
ridicule, etc.)
(5) Alteration (changes in self-presentation, such as clothing;
alterations of the environment)
(6) Tell Others/Enlist Help (tell and/or enlist help from friends, coworkers, spouse
(7) Physical Reaction (slap, hit, shove, physically resist or retaliate,
etc.)
(8) Internal Report (report to supervisor, manager, or other
company official)
(9) External Report (report to EEOC, state or local agency, contact
police, take legal action)
(10) Leave Field (quit job, transfer)"7
Obviously, various assertiveness "sub-continua" exist within this
broad array. For example, the variety of positive and negative verbal
confrontation strategies suggests a subcontinuum of assertiveness
within the larger continuum. Direct communication has its own place
on the assertiveness continuum of response behaviors generally, and
36. David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, The Identification and Classification of
Reactions to Sexual Harassment,10 J. ORG. BEHAv. 1 (1989).

37. Id. at 4.
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varying direct communication methods create a sub-continuum of
assertiveness in the direct communication domain.
In 1989 James Gruber developed a similar assertiveness
continuum-based system,38 which he applied in a 1995 study analyzing
harassment response patterns in a large sample (n=1990) of Canadian
women.39 The Gruber classification scheme includes the following
response categories:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Ignore
Avoid
Change Ways
Spoke to Someone

(5)

Direct Response

(6)

Report

(7)

Quit'

In a similar vein, Gutek and Koss have proposed a two dimensional
system, which classifies responses both by degree of assertiveness and
according to whether the response involved seeking help from others.4 ,
2.

Classification Systems Incorporating Internally Focused
Coping Strategies

The Terpstra & Baker, Gruber, and Gutek & Koss classification
schemes distinguish primarily between various externally focused
strategies, and then organize these strategies according to their judged
degree of assertiveness. Although these systems provide a useful
starting point, they fail to include a wide variety of internally focused
cognitive strategies, which harassment victims may also deploy to cope
with unwanted sexualized workplace conduct. In the externally focused
systems, these internal strategies are generally subsumed within a
broad, and somewhat misleading, heading of "ignoring" or "doing
'
nothing."42
The first of the internally focused classification systems was
developed by Louise Fitzgerald in connection with a large study of

38. James E. Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment:A LiteratureReview, 74

Soc. & Soc. REs. 3 (1989).
39. Gruber & Smith, supra note 32, at 549.
40. Id. at 552.
41. Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations:
Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment,42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAv. 28 (1993).
42. See, e.g., Tepstra & Baker, supra note 36, at 5.
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4
actual responses of sexual harassment victims conducted in 1988.
Fitzgerald's system consists of ten responsive strategies, classified as
either internally focused or externally focused. The externally focused
strategies include avoidance, appeasement, assertion, seeking institutional
or organizationalrelief,and seeking social support. The internally focused
strategies include endurance (which may be externally manifested as
"ignoring the behavior" or "doing nothing"); denial (pretending the
situation is not happening or has no effect on one's self); detachment;
illusory control (self-blame); and reattribution ("reinterpreting the
situation in such a way that it [is] not defined as harassment").'
As a theoretical matter, Fitzgerald's focus on internally focused
coping strategies bears a close resemblance to more generalized
psychological models of cognitive strategies people use to cope with
aversive life situations, such as those posited by Lazarus and Folkman.4 5
This approach, as Fitzgerald and her collaborators have noted,
"reconceptualize[s] responses within the context of modern cognitive
approaches to understanding stressful life situations . . . and .
invoke[s] the extensive body of stress and coping research to analyze
responses to harassment." '46

3.

Patterns of Response to Sexualized Workplace Conduct:
GeneralDistributionsby Response Modality

The Faragheraffirmative defense, both as it was originally posited
by the Faragher majority, and as it is being elaborated and applied by
the lower federal courts, defines the "reasonableness" of a woman's
response to sexualized workplace conduct primarily in terms of her
utilization of formal, internal employer complaint procedures. In short,
when confronted with sexualized conduct in the workplace, Faragher's
reasonable woman reports early and often. But even the most cursory
review of the social science literature investigating women's responses
43. Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan, & Karla Fischer, Why Didn't She Just
Report Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual
Harassment, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 117, 119 (1995) (discussing Louise F. Fitzgerald's paper,
Assessing Strategiesfor Coping with Harassment:A Theoretical/EmpiricalApproach, which
she presented at the Midwinter Conference of the Association for Women in
Psychology in Tempe, Arizona).
44. Id. at 119-20.
45. See, e.g., RICHARD S. LAZARUS & SUSAN FOLKMAN, MANUAL FOR THE WAYS OF
COPING QUESTIONNAIRE (1989); RICHARD S. LAZARUS & SUsAN FOLKMAN, STRESS,
APPRAISAL, AND COPING (1984).
46. Fitzgerald, Swan, & Fischer, supranote 43, at 123.
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to sexual harassment reveals that women confronted with such conduct
rarely report it through formal channels, especially at early stages of an
escalating harassment scenario. Indeed, according to one recent review
of the relevant literature, the reporting of sexual harassment through an
employer's official, internal complaint process is among the least
frequently utilized of all defined responsive strategies, with studies
reporting a range of between two percent at the low end and fifteen
percent on the high end.47
The available empirical research, in short, reveals an understanding
of women's responses to sexual harassment quite different from the
doctrinal and normative frameworks Faragher constructs. This literature
suggests not only that the reporting of sexual harassment through
official complaint channels is rare, but also that women select from a
wide range of less drastic and arguably quite "reasonable" response
modalities in their attempts to cope with sexualized conduct in the
workplace. This range of behaviors includes both internally focused
behaviors, designed to manage the psychic stress experienced by
women when they are subjected to such conduct, and externally focused
behaviors, geared to resolve the external situation causing that psychic
stress.
Ignoring, or at least appearing to ignore the harassing behavior is
an extremely common response to sexual harassment,"" as is avoiding
the harasser or harassers.49 Importantly, however, what may appear to
sexual harassment researchers, employers, or federal judges as the
passive response of ignoring the harassing behavior or the harasser, may
actually signal the use of active, but internally focused, coping
mechanisms.

47. Patricia A. Frazier, Overview of Sexual Harassmentfrom the Behavioral Science
Perspective, paper presented at American Bar Association National Institute on Sexual
Harassment (Oct. 15-18, 1997), available at WESTLAW, N97SHCB ABA-LGLED, at
*B-I, *B-5.
48. See, e.g., Caroline C. Cochran, Patricia A. Frazier, & Andrea M. Olson,
Predictorsof Responses to Unwanted Sexual Attention, 21 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 207, 217
(1997) (observing that ignoring harassing behavior was the most common response,
elicited in sixty percent of surveyed employees at a large Midwestern university); see
also David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, A Frameworkfor the Study of Sexual
Harassment, 7 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 17, 26 (1986) (noting that sixty-one
percent of United States Merit Systems Protection Board Study respondents' responses
included "ignored/did nothing").
49. Cochran, Frazier, & Olson, supra note 48, at 217 (observing that avoiding the
harasser was a very common response, deployed by forty-five percent of surveyed
employees at a large Midwestern university).
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In a 1982 investigation, Gruber and Bjom found that ten percent of
the "blue collar" subjects they studied had used reattribution, that is, the
reinterpretation of the situation in such a way that it was not defined as
harassment, as a response to sexualized workplace conduct.' More
recent studies continue to document the use of this strategy. So, for
example, harassing workplace conduct may be attributed by its victim
to "extenuating circumstances" such as the harasser's presumed
loneliness, may be blamed on one's own actions,5 or may be recast so

as to seem otherwise benign. 2
Finally, many women respond to sexual harassment by confronting
or communicating directly with the harasser outside of the purview of
an employer's formal complaint procedure. This direct communication
may take many forms. It may include what some researchers refer to as
"appeasement,"53 or "deflective" responses, such as using humor or
stalling.' Direct communication may also assume a more "assertive"
character, such as asking the harasser to stop," attacking him verbally,
or responding to his behavior physically.56
By far, across a variety of studies spanning a number of years and
a range of occupations, the least frequent response to sexualized
workplace conduct involves seeking organizational relief, that is,
50. James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Blue-Collar Blues: The Sexual Harassment of
Women Autoworkers. 9 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 271 (1982).
51. See, e.g., Vita C. Rabinowitz, Coping with Sexual Harassment,in IVORY POWER:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 103, 106-07 (Michele A. Paludi ed., 1990) (noting that
this response is common); see also Inger W. Jensen & Barbara A. Gutek, Attributions and
Assignment of Responsibility in Sexual Harassment, 38 J. Soc. ISSUES 121 (1982) (finding
that twenty-five percent of female harassment victims attributed the harassment in
some way to their own behavior).
52. See, e.g., Rabinowitz, supra note 51, at 108-09 (discussing harassing behavior
in the context of student-faculty relationships); see also BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND
THE WORKPLACE (1985).

53. Fitzgerald, Swan, & Fischer, supra note 43, at 120 (defining appeasement as
"an attempt to 'put off' the harasser without direct confrontation (i.e., humor, excuses,
delaying, etc.)," and noting that "humor is particularly common in less serious
situations").
54. See Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 50, at 280 (reporting in their study of blue
collar women's responses to sexualized workplace conduct that fifteen percent of
subjects verbally attacked their harassers and that seven percent attacked them
physically).
55. See, e.g., UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 24 (1988) [hereinafter
USMSPB, AN UPDATE] (reporting that forty-four percent of women in the studied
sample of federal employees reported having directly requested of the harasser that he
desist in his behavior and leave her alone).
56. Fitzgerald, Swan, & Fischer, supra note 43, at 121.
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bringing a formal complaint against the harasser. 7 In a meta-analysis
combining the results of numerous studies, Dansky and Kilpatrick
calculated an average formal complaint rate of five percent. 8 The
highest rate observed was fifteen percent, in a national sample consisting only of cases judged to meet the EEOC definition of actionable
harassment.5 9
Although its reporting rate falls at the low end of the spectrum, the
following data illustrate the relative distribution of official report in
relation to other responsive strategies:
Table 1. Occurrenceof Externally FocusedResponse Behaviors
Externally Focused
Response Behaviors

Percentageof Women
Employing the Response Behavior

Reporting through official mechanisms

2%

Ignore the harasser/harassing behavior

60%

Avoid the harasser

45%

Direct communication

25%

In evaluating the low rate of internal complaint-filing as a response
to sexual harassment, it is important to note that there exists a wide gap
between how women actually respond to sexual conduct in the
workplace and what observers say a woman facing such a situation
should do, or what they themselves anticipate they would do if faced
with a similar situation.6 ' So for example, in one study, when subjects
were presented with a hypothetical sexual harassment scenario, ninety57. Id.
58. Bonnie S. Dansky & Dean G. Kilpatrick, Effects of Sexual Harassment, in
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT 152, 158 (William
O'Donohue ed., 1997).
59. Id.
60. See Cochran, Frazier, & Olson, supra note 48, at 217. It should be noted that
the percentages reflected in this figure do not add up to 100% because many subjects
employed more than one response modality.
61. See, e.g., Douglas D. Baker et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment: A ReExamination of Gender Differences, 124 J. PSYCHOL. 409 (1990); Louise F. Fitzgerald,
Sexual Harassment: Violence Against Women in the Workplace, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1070
(1993); Gutek & Koss, supra note 41.
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two percent of subjects responded that, if confronted with certain types
of sexualized conduct, they would report through official channels. Yet
among those subjects who had actually been subjected to conduct of the
type described, not one had actually filed an official complaint.62
Federal judges and jurors applying Faragher's "reasonable response" defense, of course, stand in a position analogous to subjects
asked how they think they would respond, or how they think a woman
should respond if faced with a particular harassment scenario. They may
well, like the subjects in these empirical studies, overestimate the
likelihood that they would respond by filing an official complaint, and
then impose this idea of what is "reasonable" on harassment plaintiffs.
A sexual harassment plaintiff, in contrast, stands in the position of
a research subject reporting her actual response to a real situation
involving sexualized workplace conduct. She is far less likely to have
filed an official complaint of sexual harassment than her post-hoc
evaluators think they would have, or think she should have.
B.

Women's Reported Explanations for Selecting Particular
Responsive Strategies

In addition to classifying response modalities and quantifying the
relative frequency with which such modalities are employed, the
literature also examines the reasons women give for employing, or
declining to employ, differing response strategies. In many of these
studies, women's stated reasons for not reporting sexual harassment
through formal channels included beliefs that informal channels were
adequate, that a formal report was unnecessary, that the conduct was
not sufficiently serious, or that the conduct might not legally constitute
harassment.63 In explaining their decisions not to report, many subjects
62. See, e.g., Jean W. Adams et al., Sexual Harassmentof UniversityStudents, 24 J. C.
STUDENT PERSONNEL

484 (1983). Adams and her colleagues note:

Most respondents, especially women, said they would report personal
experiences of physical advances, explicit sexual propositions, or sexual
bribery; only 8% of the females ... indicated that they would not report such
behavior. Among those students, however, who had experienced these
behaviors, no one had reported it to any university official . . . . Thus, there
seems to be a marked contrast between what students think they would do
and what students actually do when confronted with these behaviors.
Id. at 488-89; accord, Fitzgerald, Swan, & Fischer, supra note 43, at 119 ("Actual
victims have been shown to behave quite differently than research participants or the
general public say they would behave.").
63. Frazier, supra note 47, at *B-5.
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cited concerns that reporting harassment would negatively effect their
work environment, causing them to be blamed or retaliated against. In
many studies, women stated that they declined to report because they
did not think that filing a report would do any good. These women
commonly reported fears that nothing would be done about the
harassment even if they complained, or that their factual account would
not be believed."
Indeed, in a recent study, Rudman, Borgida, and Robertson
demonstrated not only that many women exposed to sexualized
workplace behavior stated that they did not file a formal complaint
because they believed that it would not do any good, but also that a
woman's beliefs about the efficacy of complaining was the best
predictor of internal complaint-filing behavior.65
C.

Situational and Individual Variables as Predictors of Response
Modality

In addition to describing women's stated reasons for not reporting
sexual harassment through an employer's official, internal complaint
mechanism, many studies explore the relationship between the
assertiveness of subjects' responses to sexual harassment and a variety
of potentially predictive factors, including situational variables
characterizing the harassment scenario and individual/personal
characteristics of the harassment victim. Although many of these
studies employ simple correlations rather than multivariate analytical
methods and are therefore of limited predictive utility,' a brief
description of their basic findings is useful.
1.

The Influence ofSituationalVariables on Response Modalities

Both the correlative and the multivariate studies of women's
responses to unwanted sexual conduct find, with little variation, that
conduct severity is the strongest predictor of subjects' responses.67 The
64. Amy Culbertson & Paul Rosenfeld, Assessment of Sexual Harassment in the
Active-Duty Navy, 6 MEL. PsYCHOL. 69 (1994) (eliciting this response from thirty percent
of subjects).
65. Laurie A. Rudman et al., Suffering in Silence: ProceduralJustice Versus Gender
Socialization Issues in University Sexual Harassment Grievance Procedures, 17 BASIC &
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 519 (1995).
66. Frazier, supra note 47, at *B-3 (observing that many studies simply examine
statistical correlations and do not construct multivariate models).
67. See, e.g., Gruber & Smith, supra note 32, at 552-53 (examining the responses
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effect of this factor is sufficiently strong that its presence confounds the
effect of other variables, making their impact difficult to gauge.
For example, various studies show that women are more likely to
report harassment by supervisors than harassment by co-workers.68
However, other studies indicate that harassment by supervisors tends to
be objectively more severe than harassment by co-workers.69 Hence,
without more statistically sophisticated analysis, it is impossible to
determine from the first group of studies whether harasser status in fact
predicts formal complaint behavior, or whether the observed correlation
is merely a by-product of conduct severity. In any event, it is significant
for present purposes to note that women harassed by supervisors
generally report being less satisfied with the outcome of formal
complaint procedures than do women harassed by co-workers. °
The duration of the sexual harassment may also affect subjects'
response strategies, although studies investigating this issue show
mixed results and are in various ways difficult to interpret. Some
investigations reveal that the longer harassment persists, the more likely
women are to develop aggressive response strategies, such as reporting
through official complaint mechanisms." Other studies indicate that
greater duration of harassment may prompt avoidance of the harasser,
or going along with the harassment, responses traditionally categorized
as passive.72 These results are difficult to interpret, however, because
to sexual harassment of a representative sample of Canadian women); see also Douglas
D. Baker et al., The Influence of Individual Characteristicsand Severity of Harassing
Behavior on Reactions to Sexual Harassment, 22 SEX ROLES 305, 320 (1990) ("[T]he
severity of the sexual harassment situations had a relatively strong influence on reaction
type.") For a discussion of other studies finding the same effect, see Fitzgerald, Swan,
& Fischer, supra note 43, at 121.
68. Cochran, Frazier, & Olson, supra note 48 at 218; J. Livingston, Responses to
Sexual Harassmenton the Job: Legal, Organizational,and Individual Actions, 38 J. SOC.
IssuEs 5 (1982).
69. See, e.g., Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 50; see also Pamela Hewitt Loy & Lea P.
Stewart, The Extent and Effects ofSexual Harassmentof Working Women, 17 Soc. Focus 31
(1984).
70. Shereen G. Bingham & Lisa L. Scherer, Factors Associated with Responses to
Sexual Harassment and Satisfaction with Outcome, 29 SEx ROLES 239 (1993); Livingston,
supranote 68.
71. See, e.g., Cochran, Frazier, & Olson, supra note 48, at 218 (noting that duration
of harassment was directly related to the perception of the harassment as severe, which
was directly related to aggressiveness of response strategies).
72. See Rebecca A. Thacker, A Descriptive Study of Situational and Individual
Influences Upon Individuals'Responses to Sexual Harassment,49 HUMAN RELATIONS 1105
(1996). Thacker observes:
The significant and positive relationship between duration of the harassment
and avoidance/going along responses suggests that individuals give up after
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their research designs did not control for other variables, such as
attempts to enlist institutional/organizational support, which, depending
on outcome, might have influenced the selection of response modalities
over time.
Other environmental factors appear to influence harassment
response behaviors, including the decision whether or not to file a
formal internal harassment complaint. So, for example, a recent study
by James Gruber and Michael Smith indicates that women are significantly more likely to mobilize an internal complaint procedure when the
employer's sexual harassment policies have been presented to employees in at least four different ways." Gruber and Smith's analysis
suggests that the type of policy or procedure is less important in
influencing complaint behavior than the number of ways in which the
policy or procedure has been presented to employees. Merely presenting the policy on one occasion, such as in an employee handbook that
the employee is instructed to read and sign, or by simply placing posters
in the work environment, does not significantly influence utilization of
formal complaint procedures. 4 These findings are highly significant to
an evaluation of post-Faragherdecisions in the lower courts, which with
increasing frequency hold that the simple promulgation of an antiharassment policy in an employee handbook will satisfy Faragher's
"employer duty of reasonable care to prevent harassment from occur'
ring."75
In general, after harassment severity is controlled, organizational factors such as those described by Bjorn and Smith appear to be
the best predictors of victim response. 6
a while, becoming passive rather than active in trying to rid their
environment of the unwanted social-sexual behavior. The longer the
harassment continues, the more likely the organization sends a signal that
harassers will be tolerated, which in turn, prompts avoidance or going along
responses.
Id. at 1117.
73. Gruber & Smith, supra note 32, at 553.
74. Id
75. The most outrageous of these cases is undoubtedly Leopold v. Baccarat,Inc., 82
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 105. The plaintiff in Leopold argued that the employer
could not establish the affirmative defense because Baccarat had failed to take
reasonable care in preventing harassment from occurring or in stopping it should it
occur. Citing Baccarat's employee handbook, which contained an anti-harassment
policy, the court found that the defendant had satisfied its duty of care, stating, "[t]he
law is very clear that any reasonable policy will do." Id. at 107.
76. See, e.g., Denise H. Lach & Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs, Sociological
Perspectives on Sexual Harassmentand Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 J. VOCATIONAL
BERAV. 102 (1993); M. Hesson-McGinnis & L. F. Fitzgerald, Predicting the Outcomes
of Sexual Harassment: A Preliminary Test (1992) (paper presented at the 2d
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The Influence of Individual Target Characteristics on Response Modalities

A great deal of research has focused on attempts to identify
individual target characteristics capable of predicting women's
responses to sexualized workplace conduct. On the whole, this research
has proven disappointing. In contrast to situational variables, individual
target characteristics appear to exercise at best a weak effect on
harassment responses.
Many studies have investigated the relationship between targets'
job status and women's responses to sexualized workplace conduct.
Gruber and Smith's 1995 investigation, for example, examined the
utility of occupational status in predicting responses to sexual harassment, comparing white collar, blue collar, and mid- and low-level
white-collar workers' responses." Although Gruber and Smith
hypothesized that women with more organizational authority would
respond more assertively to harassment than their low-authority
counterparts, the observed difference, controlling for other factors, was
insignificant.'
Various investigations of the effect of individual target characteristics on responses to sexualized workplace conduct incorporate a
sociocultural account, which posits that both sexual harassment and
responses to sexual harassment result from culturally legitimated power
and status differentials.79 Along these lines, Gruber and Bjorn noted that
[w]hile women as a group are victimized by sexual attacks, not all
women are equally vulnerable. Specifically, women who lack
cultural power and status advantages are especially apt to be the
targets of sexual harassment. Young, unattached (single or divorced),
and minority women have been found to be the targets of severe
and/or frequent harassment.'
APA/NIOSH Conference on Stress and the Workplace, Washington D.C., on file with

author).
77. Gruber & Smith, supra note 32, at 552-53.
78. Id. at 555. Curiously, the study did reveal slightly greater differences between
white and blue-collar workers' tendencies toward assertive responses; as compared with
mid- and low-level white-collar workers, blue collar workers were somewhat more
likely to demonstrate assertive responses. Id. at 554.
79. Gruber & Bjom, supra note 50, at 274-75; cf Cochran, Frazier, & Olson, supra
note 48, at 222 ("In terms of understanding power, researchers must look not only at
power associated with one's position in an organization but also at power associated
with one's status in society.").
80. Gruber & Bjorn, supra note 50, at 275.
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Extending this point further, Gruber and Bjorn hypothesize that
women who are harassed because of low sociocultural power (i.e.,
youth, lack of male "protection," or racism) would be more likely to
exhibit powerlessness in their responses to harassment.$' Their data
however did not strongly support this hypothesis. Gruber and Bjorn
noted that
[t]hough black women receive more severe harassment than whites,
and young and nonmarried women are attacked more frequently than
their peers, these women do not respond differently than others. It
seems, then, that while some women are targets of harassment
because of differences in sociocultural power, they tend to respond
in a fairly similar manner regardless of these differences in
sociocultural power.8 2
The one evident exception to this general observation that social
location exercises at best a weak influence on response modality is a
finding in some well-designed studies that older and better-educated
women tend to respond more assertively to unwanted sexualized
workplace conduct than do younger, less well-educated women."3
Although few individual characteristics have proven capable of
predicting responses to sexualized behavior in the workplace, attitudes
towards sexual harassment, and feminist ideology more generally,
appear in many studies to exercise a significant effect. For example, in
their 1995 investigation of Canadian women, Gruber and Smith found
that women's responses to sexualized workplace conduct were
significantly influenced by their attitudes about sexual harassment."
Specifically, women who reported believing that sexual harassment was
about male power or male dominance avoided or ignored harassing
81. Id at 276.
82. James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment: An
Analysis of Sociocultural, Organizational,and PersonalResource Models, 67 Soc. Sci. Q.

814, 819 (1986). It is important to note that Gruber and Bjorn's valuable study of racial
power differentials' effects on responses to sexual harassment focused exclusively on
comparing the experiences and response behaviors of black women and white women.
Furthermore, Gruber and Bjorn's conclusion that black women and white women
respond "the same" to sexual harassment may be tempered by other studies' consistent
findings that harassment of a greater severity should prompt a more assertive response.
Given that black women are targets of more frequent and more severe sexual
harassment, these studies suggest that black women should respond more assertively,
and not as assertively, as white women.
83. See, e.g., Cochran, Frazier, & Olson, supra note 48, at 218 (using status at
university as proxy for age); Rudman et al., supranote 65, at 531.
84. Gruber & Smith, supra note 32, at 555.
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conduct significantly less frequently than women who did not report
this belief 5 Moreover, women who reported viewing harassment as a
power issue reported harassment at a rate twice as high as the rate at
which other women reported."6 Other studies find that generalized
feminist beliefs are associated with more assertive responses to
harassing conduct, including decisions to report, 7 while high sex role
traditionality and tendencies toward self-blame are associated with
more passive responses.8 8
D.

Assessing the Effectiveness of Various Harassment
Modalities

Response

As we have seen, women utilize a variety of responses to cope with
unwanted sexual behavior in the workplace, and they provide a variety
of explanations for their choices among various response modalities. As
we have further seen, a cluster of situational and individual variables,
most significantly harassment severity, the frequency of employer
expressions of intolerance for harassing behavior, women's beliefs
regarding the efficacy of internal complaint procedures, and women's
attitudes towards harassment specifically and feminist beliefs more
generally, prove modestly but significantly predictive of women's
choices among various available response modalities.
Many women decide not to report incidents of sexual harassment
through official internal complaint mechanisms because they believe
that other strategies, including direct communication with the harasser,
will prove effective in remedying the situation. In fact, there exists a
great deal of evidence indicating that this belief is correct.
For example, in all three studies of federal female employees
conducted by the Merit Systems Protection Board, women who had
experienced and taken action to remedy unwanted sexual conduct in the
workplace reported confronting the harasser directly as the most
effective response, with fifty to sixty percent of women reporting that
this strategy was effective. 9 Similar results were obtained in two recent
85. Id
86. Id. (comparing rates of 9.4% and 501/,respectively).
87. See, e.g., Brooks & Perot, supra note 31.
88. Jensen & Gutek, supra note 51, at 134 (noting that sex role traditionality and
self-blame are predictors of passive response modalities).
89. UNrrED STATES MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT INTHE
FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? (1981) [hereinafter USMSPB, PROBLEM];
UNITED STATES MERiT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
(1995) [hereinafter
WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES
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studies of harassment in educational settings."° In the earlier of these
two studies, direct communication with the perpetrator was the only
responsive strategy associated with high outcome satisfaction. In
contrast, mobilization of formal complaint procedures did not appear to
help resolve harassment situations to the satisfaction of harassed
employees or students.9
Many women decline to confront their harassers or report incidents
of unwanted sexualized workplace conduct through official grievance
procedures because they fear that doing so will make their situation
worse, either by negatively affecting their relationships with co-workers
or by triggering retaliation by supervisors or managers.9 In fact, there
is a good deal of evidence suggesting that these fears are often wellfounded. In a nationwide study conducted in 1992, approximately
twenty-five percent of women who had confronted a harasser reported
that they had subsequently been retaliated against.93 In a study of
Connecticut workers who had confronted their harasser or filed formal
harassment grievances, sixty-two percent reported that they had been
retaliated against. Among less tangible things, this perceived retaliation
took the form of lowered evaluations (12%), denial of promotion (7%),
unwanted transfer (2%), and termination (5%).94 Other more recent
studies have yielded similar results.95
Studies indicate particularly low levels of satisfaction with the
filing of formal harassment complaints through internal employer
grievance procedures. Fully thirty percent of the women in the first
Merit Systems Protection Board study who had filed formal harassment
complaints reported that the strategy had made the situation worse." A
1992 study of women in the Navy also found that approximately thirty
percent of women who complained had experienced negative outcomes,
including being "humiliated in front of others." 9 And as late as the
USMSPB, TRENDS]; USMPB, AN UPDATE, supra note 55.
90. Bingham & Scherer, supra note 70, at 264; Cochran, Frazier, & Olson, supra
note 48, at 224.
91. Bingham & Scherer, supra note 70, at 263.
92. See supra text accompanying note 64.
93. Frazier, supra note 47, at *B-6 (discussing a paper by Bonnie S. Dansky and
others presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association
entitled Sexual Harassment: I Can't Define It, But I Know It When I See It).
94. Loy & Stewart, supranote 69, at 31.
95. See, e.g., AMY L. CULBERTSON ET AL., NAVY PERSONNEL RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NAVY: RESULTS OF
THE 1989 NAVY-WIDE SURVEY 17 (1992); Hesson-McGinnis & Fitzgerald, supra note 76.
96. USMSPB, PROBLEM, supra note 89, at 91.
97. Culbertson & Rosenfeld, supra note 64.
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1995 Merit Systems Protection Board study, filing a formal grievance
was perceived as the response strategy most likely to make a harassment situation worse. 98
This perception that filing an internal harassment complaint is
dangerous can only be reinforced by the United States Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncement on sexual harassment and retaliation. In a
bizarre post-Faraghertwist worthy of a Franz Kafka novel, the Court
held in Clark County School Districtv. Breeden" that a woman who had
filed an internal complaint of sexual harassment with her employer was
not protected from retaliation, because no reasonable person could
believe that a single incident of harassment like the one she reported
could constitute a violation of Title VII.'
Evidently, it did not occur
to the author of the Breeden Court's brief, per curiam opinion that, by
reporting the objectionable conduct early, the plaintiff had behaved
precisely as prescribed in Faragherand Ellerth. Breeden leaves workers
in a vicious double bind: if they do not report early, they may well lose
their claim under the Faragheraffirmative defense, but if they do report
early, before a hostile work environment claim has emerged, they will
have no legal protection from retaliation. It really should come as no
surprise, then, if women shy away from reporting unwanted sexualized
conduct early in an escalating sequence of harassing events.
IIl. APPLYING SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW:
NORMATIVE, DESCRIPTIVE, AND DOCTRINAL INTERACTIONS

The sexual harassment response literature supplies no single metric
by which to measure the reasonableness of plaintiffs' response
behaviors. Instead, it supports the far less simplistic notion that how a
woman will respond to sexual harassment will depend on how she
experiences the harassment and what she believes will be the likely
consequences flowing from different responsive strategies. This
suggests that if we want to understand a particular woman's response
to sexualized workplace conduct, we will have to carefully examine the
full complexity of features characterizing her workplace as a social
environment. Response strategies are shaped by these situational
features, can be expected to change over time, and must be understood
as serving many different functions, including management or ameliora98. USMSPB, TRENDS, supra note 89.
99. 121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001) (per curiam), rehg. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2264 (2001).
100. Breeden, 121 S. Ct. at 1510.
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tion of the harassment situation itself, management of one's own
emotional reaction to that situation, and avoidance of "collateral
damage" stemming from the effects of unsuccessful responsive
strategies. Unfortunately, as Professor Beiner's review of the postFaragher case law demonstrates,'' lower court applications of the
Faragher defense lack anything even approaching such a nuanced view.
Whether, as an institutional matter, courts are suited to conduct this sort
of close, contextual evaluation is a matter of considerable uncertainty.
The descriptive account underlying Faragher's second prong
depicts a world in which, absent some personality quirk or flaw, a
woman who is truly subjected to unwelcome sexualized conduct in the
workplace can be expected to complain about it to her employer. But as
we have seen, this is not the world in which we actually live. The
overwhelming majority of women subjected to sexualized workplace
conduct do not complain to their employers about it, at least not early
in an escalating sequence of harassing events.
Similarly, as Professor Bisom-Rapp has demonstrated,'0 2 the
descriptive account underlying Faragher's first prong blithely assumes
that employer policies, training programs, and complaint procedures
hold the power significantly to reduce the occurrence of harassment or
discrimination. As Professor Bisom-Rapp explains, the same assumption informs the Court's recent pronouncements on employer liability
for punitive damages under Title VII.10 3 And yet, as Professor BisomRapp shows, we have virtually no evidence that this account is in any
way accurate; the Court simply assumes it so.
As Professor Beiner and Bisom-Rapp's investigations suggest,
social science provides us with useful tools for interrogating the implicit
models of human and organizational behavior undergirding doctrinal
structures. In other words, social science evidence permits us to
determine whether, with respect to aspects of human or organizational
behavior implicated by legal rules, the courts' normative, descriptive,
and doctrinal accounts cohere. Sometimes, we find, they do not. In
shaping legal doctrine, courts sometimes presume a behavioral world
that does not actually exist. But here lurks a difficult question. Does
101. Beiner, Sex, Science, and Social Knowledge, supra note 29 at 277-91 (reviewing
trends in lower court applications of the Faragher affirmative defense); Beiner, supra
note 25, at 120-31 (same).
102. Bisom-Rapp, supra note 24, at 29-43.
103. Id. at 10-12 (describing the logic underlying Kolstad's punitive damage liability
"safe harbor" for employers promulgating anti-discrimination policies and conducting
anti-discrimination training).
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such disjunction, if it exists, really matter, either generally, or in this
particular case? Does it matter, for example, whether the descriptive
account of victim response underlying the second prong of the Faragher
affirmative defense is wrong? With respect to the first prong, does it
matter that there exists no sound empirical basis for believing that
policies, grievance procedures, and training actually reduce the
incidence or severity of harassment? The answer, I suggest, is, "it
depends." Specifically, it depends on the precise nature of the normative claim on which the doctrinal structure rests.
Let us assume for a moment that the moral intuition underlying the
second prong is that it is simply unfair to allow employers to be legally
"blindsided" by unexpected sexual harassment claims. A proponent of
this view might ask, "why should a person who is subjected to

unwanted sexualized workplace conduct be permitted to stay quiet
about it, then spring a sexual harassment lawsuit on her employer?"
One would reasonably argue that an employer should not be held
responsible for a harm of which it unaware and which it was denied the
opportunity to prevent or mitigate. Such an outcome, the argument
might go, would be unjust, especially in cases involving sexualized
workplace conduct, which, after all, is often ambiguous, hidden, or
consensual.
So, the second prong might reasonably be based on the notion that
it is just not "fair" for a woman to remain silent about behavior she does
not appreciate, then turn around and sue her employer for compensatory
and punitive damages with no advance warning. Such an outcome
would be especially unfair in those situations in which the first prong
was satisfied-that is, where the employer had taken steps to prevent
harassment from occurring.
If this normative account undergirds the second prong, it really
does not matter what social science tells us about how women commonly respond to sexualized conduct in the workplace. Common
behavior is not necessarily normative behavior--or, for that matter,
lawful behavior. Indeed, when Title VII was first enacted, most-or at
least many employers did discriminate based on race, sex, and national
origin. In interpreting and enforcing Title VII in those early days, it
mattered not one bit that the doctrinal and normative accounts underlying the emerging Title VII anti-discrimination jurisprudence diverged
from empirically verifiable patterns of prevailing individual and
organizational behavior.
My point is this: while it is true, as both Professor Beiner's and my
own research suggests, that the Supreme Court's normative account of
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how sexual harassment victims should respond diverges significantly
from the empirically accurate account of how most victims do respond,
that is not enough to make the second prong "bad law." Normative and
descriptive accounts of human behavior made relevant by legal rules do
not and need not always correspond to render those rules sound as a
matter of social policy or just as a matter of moral philosophy. Perhaps
courts should not listen to the stories of sexual harassment victims in
deciding whether unreported harassment should be actionable any more
than courts should listen to the stories of weary doctors or impatient
drivers in determining whether botched surgeries or reckless driving
should be legally actionable. Prevalent conduct is often not desirable
conduct.
Let me extend this point, suggesting a second normative theory
under which disjunction between the normative and descriptive
accounts embedded in Faragher's second prong would hold little legal
policy significance. Not all sexualized workplace conduct is unwelcome. In light of this, how closely do we want employers to monitor
employees' behavior in matters bearing on sexuality? Do we actually
want employers to monitor employees' behavior so closely that they
will be able to detect any and all sexualized workplace conduct? Once
such conduct is detected, how far do we really want employers to go to
determine whether such conduct is welcomed? In the interests of Title
VII compliance, do we want to encourage employers to prohibit all
sexualized workplace conduct on the grounds that such conduct might
be or in the future become unwelcome?
Some people might answer "yes, employers should do these
things." But most of us, I suggest, would not want to work in such an
environment.'" It would entail too great an intrusion on our personal
liberty; it would require too substantial an invasion of our personal
privacy. Viewed in this light, the second prong, interpreted so as to
require a harassment victim to complain, could be seen as providing a
way to mediate between two sets of competing employee interests-interests in being protected from unwelcome sexual conduct on
the one hand, and interests in sexual privacy and liberty on the other.
Under this "competing interests" justification, a disparity between
the normative and descriptive accounts of women's responses to
sexualized workplace conduct would be utterly insignificant. Under this
104. See generally Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J.
1683 (1998) (cautioning against a sexual harassment jurisprudence that too quickly
equates sexualized workplace conduct with harassment impinging on antidiscrimination principles).
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framework, a complaint requirement is interposed between a harassment victim and a legal remedy in order to provide a mechanism for
balancing two important sets of competing interests, and thus avoid
establishing a system of legal incentives that would encourage
employers to institute overly intrusive, even oppressive, anti-fraternization rules and workplace surveillance systems.
We could, of course, approach the problem from an entirely
different angle. Actual patterns of victim response to sexualized
workplace conduct will be of little consequence if employer liability
rules are premised not on the goal of harassment prevention, but rather
on the notion that organizations should be held responsible, even if not
really to blame, for foreseeable harms resulting from organizational
activities.
In many contexts, agency principles hold employers responsible for
their employees' misconduct, even if that conduct specifically violated
vigorously enforced employer policies, about which extensive employee training had been conducted. For example, a trucking company
may have explicit policies prohibiting speeding or other forms of
reckless driving, and may conduct extensive training in driving safety.
It may even place a large, bold message of the back of each of its
trucks, saying, "How am I driving? Call 1-800-451-9987," so that it
might be alerted to problematic employee conduct. But, under established agency principles applied in virtually every state, if despite all
these precautions, a company driver speeds through an intersection and
runs over a little old lady, the company will be held liable. Operating in
the shadow of modern agency principles, enterprises establish policies
and complaint procedures, and conduct employee training, to minimize
the likelihood that bad things will happen, not because these prophylactic measures, in and of themselves, are legally sufficient to absolve the
business of liability for accidents that do occur. Under the normative
framework reflected in modern agency law, if a company reaps the
economic benefits derived from its activities, we expect it to assume the
reasonably foreseeable costs of those activities as well.
If we apply this principle of enterprise responsibility for foreseeable enterprise-caused harm to the problem of supervisor sexual
harassment, we see that it matters little whether the harassment victim
utilized an available grievance procedure. Even if ninety percent of
women responded to unwanted sexualized workplace conduct by
complaining to their employers, such complaints would not constitute
a prerequisite to a legal remedy. If our goal is to internalize to the
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employer the costs of sexual harassment by its managerial agents,
patterns of victim response are not particularly relevant.
Similarly, if employer liability rules are premised on principle of
enterprise-based responsibility for foreseeable enterprise-caused harms,
whether a harm-causing enterprise has taken prophylactic measures to
reduce the likelihood of a particular harm's occurrence should be
irrelevant as well-at least with respect to the imposition of liability.
Like trucking accidents, sexual harassment happens; it is a reasonably
foreseeable harm flowing from the operation of a business. Its costs,
along with others the enterprise might impose on others should be
internalized, or so the argument would go." 5
When courts devise new legal rules, one often finds embedded in
their analysis three accounts-a doctrinal account, a normative account,
and a descriptive account-of the patterns of human and organizational
behavior implicated by those rules. Increasingly, and quite noticeably
in the area of anti-discrimination law, the descriptive accounts
embedded in and underpinning legal doctrine are inaccurate, or
incomplete. Social science research, from which judicial social
engineering projects often seem oddly isolated, has in many respects
discredited the implicit theories of individual and organizational
behavior on which much of anti-discrimination doctrine is premised."0 '
Sometimes this disjunction matters, and sometimes it does not. In the
area of sexual harassment law, I would argue however, it matters quite
a lot.
As Professor Bisom-Rapp convincingly demonstrates, the Supreme
Court, in Faragher/Ellerthand in Kolstad, has embarked on a bold new
jurisprudential project. That project, as the Court in both instances
explicitly acknowledges, involves fashioning Title VII doctrine in such
a way as will provide incentives for employers and employees to "avoid
harm." Through this bold foray into what we might call a "prophylactic
105. This, in fact, is how California state law approaches the problem of employer
liability for supervisor sexual harassment. Employers are held automatically liable for
such harassment, on the theory that, like traffic accidents in the bussing industry,
harassment is a reasonably foreseeable harm flowing from the operation of a business.
The California Fair Employment and Housing Act imposes on covered employers
automatic liability for sexual harassment by supervisors. CAL. Gov'T CODE §
129400)(1) (West 1992); Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 17 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998); Doe v. Capital Cities, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996);
Kelly Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co. Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr 2d 457, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
106. For a thorough explication of this claim with regard to Title VII disparate
treatment doctrine, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
CognitiveBias Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity,47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161 (1995).
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jurisprudence of non-discrimination," the Court approaches statutory
interpretation as an exercise in the practical application of game theory,
structuring legal rules in an explicit attempt to elicit desirable behaviors
from relevant legal actors.
This is certainly nothing new in modem law. One finds all across
the landscape of commercial, environmental, and securities law the
deliberate shaping of statutes, regulations, and judicial interpretation in
ways explicitly designed to encourage desirable behaviors and
discourage undesirable ones."° But this is most definitely a new project
in civil rights law, particularly in relation to judicial efforts to shape
victim responses to discriminatory conduct. The Supreme Court
justifies the Faragherdoctrine not on the grounds that it is somehow fair
or just, but on the grounds that its application will prevent discriminatory harms from occurring.
There is certainly nothing inherently wrong with such a judicial
undertaking. But if the Court's effort to shape individual and organizational behavior is premised on a faulty descriptive account of how
people and organizations actually behave, its project cannot be expected
to succeed. If, in fact, policies, grievance procedures, and training do
not reduce the incidence of harassment or discrimination, the Court's
new prophylactic jurisprudence will operate primarily to increase the
rates of unremedied discriminatory harms, as courts mistake symbolic
indicia of compliance with actual fealty to the norms underlying Title
VII and similar equal employment opportunity laws.
In short, legal doctrine is often premised on implicit models of
human and organizational behavior. Frequently, these models derive
from what social psychologist Lee Ross refers to as "intuitive"
psychology.'
Unfortunately, these intuitive models are often wrong.
Sometimes their inaccuracy is of little consequence. But as Ross
reminds us, "at other times, the results may be harmful to the individual
or the society, as unjust and maladaptive methods of resource allocation
and social control are justified and perpetuated."'" So it is, I fear, with
the post-Faragherlaw of hostile work environment harassment.

107. See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (examining a variety of
regulatory schemes designed to provide incentives and disincentives for behavior of

various sorts).
108. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings, 10 ADVANCES
ExPERniENTAL SOC. PSYCOioL. 173 (1977).
109. Id. at 214.

